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I. Introduction
The increased presence of U.S. companies in European markets has underscored a
subtle-yet potentially important-conflict of laws. Attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine are cornerstones of the U.S. legal system. Rationally, U.S. companies
assume that the European Union, as a group of countries with a long tradition of sophis-
ticated criminal and commercial laws, will have a corollary for these protections. Many U.S.
firms discover all too late that this assumption is incorrect as European law either does not
recognize or, at best, significantly limits these safeguards.
The problem is severe enough that the American Bar Association (ABA) is taking un-
precedented steps to advocate change in the European legal system. The ABA Board of
Governors recently approved efforts to find a case before the European Court of Justice in
which to file an amicus brief advocating for greater protection of attorney-client privilege
and the work product doctrine in the European Union.' A case filed in June against the
E.U. Commission for Competition has garnered the attention of the ABA.' If the ABA files
its case, it will mark the first time the ABA has filed an amicus brief in a court outside the
United States.'
This article outlines the disparate treatment attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine receive under U.S. and E.U. law. The authors suggest protocols that a
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multi-national company could apply to minimize exposure from this disparity. Looking at
the positive side of this conflict, the authors highlight areas of inquiry for international
litigants who may want to take advantage of this disparity.
A. THE PROBLEM ILLUSTRATED
U.S. protections relative to work by attorneys emanate from two areas of law: attorney-
client privilege in the law of evidence 4 and confidentiality in professional ethics.' In Europe,
the European Commission's decision in AM & S gave effect to principles of confidentiality
in the European Community.6 The law created by this decision was codified in the Code
of Conduct for Lawyers in the European Community (CCBE Code)7 and the Lawyer
Services Directive.' While confidentiality protections exist in both the United States and
the European Union, the scope of the protections differs significantly. Simply put, in-house
counsel enjoy the attorney-client privilege in the United States.9 In the European Union,
they do not, which presents some unique problems.s
Consider the possible impact of this disparity: if an American pharmaceutical company
contemplated acquiring a European drug manufacturer, the normal course of practice for
the U.S. firm would be to have in-house counsel participate in evaluations of the target,
discussions with business executives, review of confidential documents and other aspects of
due diligence. As part of this effort, in-house counsel would research the target's compliance
history, conducting an investigation to ensure the acquisition has complied with applicable
regulations. Assume that in the course of this investigation counsel identifies and reports
to the company's board possible violations of E.U. competition law, the board weighs the
risks, but proceeds with the acquisition nonetheless.
4. The source of attorney-client privilege is Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress
or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State,
or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EvID. 501.
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983).
6. Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 1982 ECJ CELEX LEXIS
1580, *19 (1982); see also infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. In 1993, the European Community became
the European Union. There are currently fifteen members of the European Union. They are: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Ten more countries will join in 2004. These countries are: Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
7. See Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the European Community's Legal Ethics Code Part I: An Analysis of
the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS I app. B at 63 (1993) (providing a reprint of the entire
CCBE Code).
8. Council Directive 77/249, art. 57-66, 1977 OJ. (L78) 17. With respect to national laws, the European
Union Member States recognize varying degrees of privilege. This article addresses privilege only with respect
to pan-European legal issues, like the supra-national anti-competitive law.
9. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
10. See AM & S Europe Ltd., 1982 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 1580, at *19. For a brief and recent discussion of
some of these problems, see Lombardi, supra note 1.
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Next, assume that the European Commission institutes an investigation into the trans-
action. In this subsequent investigation, the Commission requests all pertinent documents,
including in-house counsel's report and related communications. The U.S. firm learns (all
too late) that in-house counsel does not enjoy attorney-client privilege in the European
Union and the report-prepared under the assumption of confidentiality-is part of the
record considered by the Commission. The Commission then determines that the company
has violated E.U. competition law. The in-house counsel report provides the Commission
with evidence that the U.S. firm knew it was in violation of those laws when it pursued the
acquisition. Consequently, the Commission enhances the penalty imposed on the company.
This scenario is illustrative of the potential problem. Notably, it is not hypothetical-it
is based on reported European Commission action in which the European Union assessed
enhanced penalties against John Deere as a result of the Commission's review of infor-
mation contained within in-house counsel communications-communications the company
assumed were confidential and protected from disclosure. The result was an enhanced pen-
alty of 2,000,000 ECU (approximately U.S.$2,400,000)."
This Commission action pushed to the forefront the real and significant impact of the
lack of reciprocal attorney-client privileges between the United States and the European
Union. The potential ramifications can be more significant than an increased penalty from
a European regulatory body. U.S. antitrust regulators and private litigants conceivably could
take advantage of discovery obtained by the European Commission and create unexpected
consequences for a U.S. company. Further, some litigants may assert that even without
European Commission action, a U.S. firm operating in the European Union will have
effectively waived-with regard to all third-parties-any privilege that might have applied
to in-house communications regarding pan-European legal issues.
This article provides a framework for analysis of this problem and its likely ramifications
for companies and their counsel. Section II provides a background on confidentiality laws
including attorney-client privilege and codified rules of professional ethics in the United
States and the European Union, and outlines conditions under which privileges can be
asserted and waived. Section III discusses two decisions from the European Commission
in which the Commission used in-house counsel communications against the interest of
the investigated entities, first in finding violations of law and then in imposing enhanced
damages. Section IV discusses cases in the United States where discovery of in-house com-
munications has been sought under foreign no-privilege rules. The last section applies the
discussion to problems presented by parallel proceedings and internal investigations. This
section provides basic arguments counsel may assert to protect privileged communications
in light of E.U. confidentiality laws. In the alternative, this section outlines issues litigants
or regulators may consider when trying to take advantage of the E.U. laws to obtain dis-
covery of otherwise privileged information.
II. Confidentiality
Confidentiality is "the state or quality of being confidential; treated as private and
not for publication.""l Confidential communications are communications "made under
11. Commission Decision 85/79, art. 85, 1984 OJ. (L 35) 58. See also infra notes 128-137 and accompanying
text. At the time of the John Deere decision, two million ECUs were worth approximately 2.4 million U.S.
Dollars.
12. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 298 (6th ed. 1990).
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circumstances showing that [the] speaker intended [the] statement only for [the] ears of
[the] person addressed.""1 Privileged communications include those between "spouses,
physician-patient, attorney-client, [and] confessor-penitent.' ' 14 "[T]he oldest of the privi-
leges for confidential communications" is that of attorney-client. s
The attorney-client privilege is recognized to promote open and uninhibited consultation
with lawyers, this communication being widely regarded as providing a significant benefit
to society. 16 To facilitate the smooth functioning of a society governed by law, its citizenry
needs to know the law. The ability to consult with an attorney makes this possible. 7 To
ensure that such consultation will happen, it is widely accepted that citizens need, at a
minimum, assurance that consultation with counsel will not result in greater liability." As
a cornerstone for a civilization founded on the rule of law, the attorney-client privilege is
one of the oldest and most recognized of privileges.19
The utility of the attorney-client privilege, however, is not without dispute. 2° The privi-
lege can serve to suppress information necessary for the fair administration of justice. As a
result, the attorney-client privilege has been described as "not only a principle of privacy,
but also a device for cover ups."'" In promoting legal consultation under a veil of confi-
dentiality, the privilege directly conflicts with the truth seeking function of the judicial
system. 2 This tension between the importance of legal consultation and the perception that
the attorney-client privilege serves as a shelter for the guilty has created a long debate as
to the appropriate boundaries of the privilege.23
13. Id. at 1198.
14. Id.
15. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COM-
MON LAW § 2290 (1940). Wigmore traces attorney-client privilege to Elizabethan times, when, in 1577, a
solicitor was exempted from offering testimony. Id. Another scholar dates attorney-client privilege to 123
B.C.E., when Cicero, in prosecuting the Roman governor of Sicily, could not summon Hortensius, the gov-
ernor's patronus, to be a witness. Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and
Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487 (1927) (arguing that confidentiality laws can be traced to Roman times when
attorneys were servants of the persons or families whose property and affairs they managed, and that under
Roman law, servants could not testify for or against their masters because of the familial relationship that
created a duty of loyalty). For a thorough discussion of the history of attorney-client privilege, see WIGMORE,
supra §§ 2290-2329.
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 1 (1983). "The lawyer is part of the judicial system
charged with upholding the law. One of the lawyer's functions is to advise clients so that they avoid anyviolation
of the law in the proper exercise of their rights." Id.
17. See Peter H. Burkard, Attorney-Client Privilege in the EEC: The Perspective of Multinational Corporate
Counsel, 20 INT'L LAW. 677, 685-86 (1986) (describing the foundation of attorney-client privilege in Western
legal systems); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3.
18. See Burkard, supra note 17, at 686.
19. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
20. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061
(1978) (providing a detailed history of the privilege and the controversy surrounding it).
21. Id. at 1062.
22. See W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers and Butlers: The Remains ofAmoral Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 161,
168 (1995) (describing attorney-client privilege, the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment, and the
required Miranda warnings as rules "justified by reference to some goal other than the discovery of truth.").
But see JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 1.04 (2d ed. 1990) (arguing that
attorney-client privilege '!furthers the investigation of truth in our system of justice. It complements, rather
than hinders, the factual disclosure ideal.").
23. Hazard, supra note 20, at 1061. Professor Hazard describes this debate as "both interesting and trou-
bling." Id. at 1062. In discussing the scope of attorney-client privilege, he discusses the idea that the privilege
VOL. 38, NO. 1
CONFLICT IN CONFIDENTIALITY 39
The debate intensifies when the client is a corporation and the attorney is the corpora-
tion's employee, in-house counsel14 When the client is a corporation, the policy underlying
the privilege remains: it benefits society for corporations to adhere to the law; thus, cor-
porations should be encouraged to consult with counsel.25 While the general policy goals
apply, the dynamic of the details involved in corporate in-house consultations can alter the
analysis. A corporate client is an inanimate entity made animate by the directors, officers,
and employees. The in-house lawyer, who is already balancing competing interests as an
officer of the court and advocate for the corporation, is also an employee of the corpora-
tion.2 6 This position of employment introduces a third interest that affects the attorney.2 7
should apply only when a client is seeking consultation for a "legitimate" purpose and then he goes on to
discuss the difficulty in defining what is "legitimate." Id. at 1061-62. Ultimately, Professor Hazard finds no
resolution on "where to draw the boundaries-how to define the kinds of secrets that a lawyer may not keep."
Id. at 1091.
24. In the United States, the debate largely centers on whether the in-house attorney is offering business as
well as legal advice. Once the in-house lawyer begins to act as business advisor, she loses the ability to assert
attorney-client privilege for her communications with her corporate employer. Generally, to determinewhether
privilege exists, courts will consider what capacity the in-house counsel is acting in when he or she made the
communication for which the privilege is being asserted. See John M. Nonna & Michael A. Knoerzer, The
Attorney-Client Privilege and Corporate Transactions: Counsel as Keeper of Corporate Secrets, in THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE UNDER SIEGE 413, 424-32 (1989) (comparing United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35 (N.D.
Tex 1979) (holding that the Acting General Counsel and Senior Vice President of the Zale Corporation was
acting in a legal capacity when conducting employee interviews, and thus, the communications were privileged)
and Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that in-house counsel who was
also Vice President and Director of Employee Relations did not enjoy privileged communications with the
corporation because of his non-legal capacity, without consideration of the purpose of the communications)).
The most difficult issues are those involving mixed business and legal advice. See Nonna & Knoerzer, supra at
427-30 (discussing the methodology courts use in attempt to determine whether a communication is primarily
for a legal or business purpose).
25. The corporate client seeks legal advice to achieve compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
Because of the inherent difficulty in how a corporation can "disclose everything, bad as well as good" to a
lawyer, in-house counsel are in the best position to have adequate information to provide the corporate client
with effective legal advice. See GERGACZ, supra note 22, § 1.17.
26. See Wendel, supra note 22, at 162 (illustrating the lawyer's competing duties of advocate and officer of
the court by comparing it to the role of the perfect butler as illustrated in the novel KAzuo ISHIGURO, THE
REMsINs OF THE DAY 201 (1989)). In the novel, Stevens seeks to be the perfect butler. To achieve this perfection,
Stevens must exercise absolute loyalty to his employer. The conflict arises because Stevens' employer, Lord
Darlington, is a Nazi empathizer in England and requires Stevens to carry out acts of discrimination and hatred
inspired by the Nazi party's agenda. In drawing the parallel between the butler and the lawyer, Wendel quotes
Stevens stating "I simply confined myself, quite properly, to affairs within my professional realm. It is quite
illogical that I should feel any shame or regret on my own account." Id. at 1061 (quoting ISHIGURO, supra at
201). This, Wendel states, "gives comfort to many lawyers," as an absolute duty of loyalty releases the lawyer
from responsibility for the morality of the action, the lawyer is merely responsible for maintaining loyalty to
her client. As such, the lawyer is protected by a shroud of professional "nonaccountability, also known as the
amoral role of professionals." Id. at 61. The greater question thus raised and addressed by Wendel, is whether
this shroud, effectuating the amoral role of the professional, should protect a lawyer from feeling shame or
regret when her actions are dictated by the client's moral decisions. Wendel suggests that the butler, and thus
the lawyer, should ponder whether the employer, and thus the client, is worthy of such absolute loyalty. Id.
at 190.
27. "Among the fifty states, there are a number of competing tests for determining the applicability of the
attorney-client privilege in the corporate context, and the issue, despite Upjohn, is far from settled. Most states
have not adopted Upjohn explicitly, although some, such as Colorado, have. Other states, such as Illinois, have
rejected Upjohn altogether and adopted the control group test to determine which employees' communications
to corporate counsel are protected by the privilege. The majority of states, like New York, have yet to decide
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This third interest results in in-house attorneys receiving varying degrees of recognition in
different jurisdictions.
Some jurisdictions consider the impact of employment significant enough to preclude or
limit in-house attorneys from acting as legal counsel."s The concern is that when a lawyer
is dependent on the client for his livelihood, he will be less likely to exercise objective
counseling because he has too great an interest in the outcome of his advice.2 9 This concern
over the effect of employment has led some countries to prohibit in-house lawyers from
being members of the bar and/or to limit the privilege extended to communications between
corporations and their employee-attorneys. °
On the other hand, many jurisdictions give little credence to the argument that employ-
ment removes the ability of an attorney to provide objective legal counsel to the employer-
client.,' These jurisdictions give greater weight to the policy underlying the privilege,
namely the social benefit that flows from a corporation being fully informed of the laws
governing its behavior. These jurisdictions assert that an attorney who works as in-house
counsel is in the best position to provide a corporation with advice on governing laws and
compliance.32 Accordingly, jurisdictions that follow this reasoning recognize in-house at-
torneys as members of the bar, and extend attorney-client privilege to communications
made between in-house counsel and their corporate clients."
The resulting conflict of laws may result in real and significant problems for corporations
operating in the United States and the European Union. The United States recognizes in-
house counsel as full-fledged attorneys and members of the bar, extending attorney-client
privilege to communications between in-house counsel and their corporate employer-
clients.14 A majority of E.U. Member States treat in-house counsel in the same manner.
Four Member States, however, do not." Because four Member States do not accord in-
house counsel full attorney status, the European Union as a whole does not extend attorney-
client privilege to communications between corporate clients and in-house counsel.36
which standard, if either, will apply." Brian E. Hamilton, Conflict, Disparity, andIndecision: the Unsettled Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 629 (1999). See also Mark C. Van Deusen, TbeAttorney-Client
Privilege for In-House Counsel When Negotiating Contracts: A Response to Georgia Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing
Manufacturing Corp., 39 Ww. & MARY L. REV. 1397, 1404-05 (1998).
28. See Burkard, supra note 17, at 683-84 (discussing the European Commission's position that in-house
counsel do not enjoy privileged communications with their corporate clients because the lawyer must remain
independent in order to "collaborat[e] in the administration of justice." Id. (quoting EEC COMMISSION,
TWELFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLIcY 52 (1982)).
29. See Van Deusen, supra note 27, at 1404-05 (discussing the reluctance of some judges to recognize
attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel because of the fear that in-house attorneys do not have "inde-
pendence required to provide balanced legal advice.").
30. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
31. See Burkard, supra note 17, at 686 (arguing that the position of employment does not affect the ability
of in-house counsel to offer effective, and objective, legal advice to her clients).
32. See id.
33. The privilege that is extended is, of course, not absolute and comes with a number of limitations in an
attempt to temper problems that might be created by the conflicting interests the in-house lawyer faces. See
GERGACZ, supra note 22, § 3.59 (providing a thorough discussion of when attorney-client privilege exists for
corporate communications with in-house counsel).
34. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 383.
35. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
VOL. 38, NO. 1
CONFLICT IN CONFIDENTIALITY 41
To appreciate fully the genesis of this disparate treatment and its likely impact on trans-
national business, this discussion outlines confidentiality laws in the United States and the
European Union, specifically discussing how each recognizes attorney-client privilege and
comparing the respective codified rules of professional ethics regarding confidentiality.
A. CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE UNITED STATES
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides the foundation for attorney-client privilege in the
United States. 7 This rule provides that unless otherwise required by the United States
Constitution or by Act of Congress, the "privilege of a witness, person, government, State
or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law."3"
The Rule further provides that "in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element
of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege...
shall be determined in accordance with State law." 3" Under this rule, all states have rec-
ognized attorney-client privilege and have codified in their common law requirements to
claim the privilege.-
1. Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine
The attorney-client privilege may well be the pivotal element of the modern American
lawyer's professional functions. It is considered indispensable to the lawyer's function on
the theory that the advocate can adequately prepare a case only if the client is free to disclose
everything, harmful as well as helpful.41
Generally, this privilege provides for confidentiality of communications between attor-
neys and their clients.41 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.41 provides the oft-cited
expression of the conditions required for assertion of the attorney-client privilege in the
United States.- Under United Shoe, the privilege exists when:
(1) the person claiming the privilege is or seeks to be a client;
(2) the person to whom the communication was made is a member of the bar of a court and
is acting as such;
4 s
(3) the communication relates to matters conveyed by the client to the attorney in confidence
and for the purpose of obtaining a legal opinion, legal service, or assistance in a legal
proceeding;
(4) the communication is not in furtherance of a crime or tort; and
(5) the privilege is claimed and not waived by the client."
37. FED. R. EvID. 501.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. This article does not address the different treatment of attorney-client privilege in the different states
of the United States.
41. Hazard, supra note 20, at 1061. The attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine are founded
on the idea that "an attorney cannot provide full and adequate representation unless certain matters are kept
beyond the knowledge of adversaries." THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODucT DOCTRINE
99 (Edna Selan Epstein & Michael M. Martin eds., 2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter ACP & WPDI.
42. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
43. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950).
44. Id. at 358.
45. The person to whom a communication is made can be the subordinate of a bar member who is acting
in that capacity. See id.
46. See id.
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To claim the privilege, therefore, it must be affirmatively asserted. 47 The party asserting
the privilege has the burden of showing that the privilege applies to the specific commu-
nication sought by his or her adversary.45 When these conditions are met, the privilege
provides absolute protection from disclosure unless waived by the client.49
A corollary to the attorney-client privilege is the work product doctrine, often confused
with a privilege. The doctrine protects the confidentiality of work prepared in anticipation
of litigation.5 " It constitutes limited protection from disclosure, considered necessary in an
adversary judicial system.5' The doctrine is considered important as it encourages thorough
and thoughtful preparation by counsel.52 Unlike the attorney-client privilege, however, the
work product doctrine is not absolute and will not protect work if the party seeking dis-
covery can show "substantial need of the material . . . [and an inability] without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.""
2. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection for In-House Counsel
Communications
Under U.S. law, when the client is a corporation and the attorney is employed as in-
house counsel, attorney-client privilege exists when:
(1) the communication is made for the purpose of securing legal advice;
(2) the employee making the communication does so at the direction of his or her corporate
superior;
(3) the superior requests the communication to secure legal advice;
(4) the subject matter of the communication is within the scope of the employee's corporate
duties; and
(5) the communication is not disseminated beyond those who need to know its contents.1
4
In addition, the work product doctrine will protect any work prepared by in-house coun-
sel which is not necessarily a communication, but which contains the "mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney" when it relates to litigation.
5
3. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States
While the privilege is absolute, the possibility of waiver-either inadvertent or
voluntary-qualifies the protections. The client, not counsel, can voluntarily waive the
47. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp 792, 795 (D. Del. 1954) (stating "Of course,
the privilege must be claimed-it is here.").
48. See United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 281-82 (6th Cir. 1964) (stating that the privilege does not
create a "cloak of protection ... draped around all occurrences and conversations which have any bearing,
direct or indirect, upon the relationship of the attorney with his client.").
49. See ACP & WPD, supra note 41, at 1. See also infra notes 56-88 and accompanying text.
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). "A party may obtain discovery.., prepared in anticipation of litigation...
only upon a showing ... [of] substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that
the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney . . . con-
ceming the litigation." See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
51. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
52. ACP & WPD, supra note 41, at 99.
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
54. See Upohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (providing a general discussion
of the work product doctrine).
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privilege.16 Waiver can also result from offensive use of otherwise privileged informa-
tion," inadvertent disclosure,"s or intentional voluntary disclosure. s9 "Waiver" is con-
strued broadly against the party claiming the privilege. The generally accepted test is that
"any conduct by the client that would make it unfair for him thereafter to assert the
privilege" waives the privilege.
60
Disclosure of protected communications to a third-party is the greatest threat to the
protections offered by the privilege. Circumstances under which third-party disclosure con-
stitutes waiver is an issue on which the circuit courts split. This split is partially due to
ambiguities in the statutory laws that require disclosure of all relevant documents,6' and the
voluntary disclosure provisions62 of many governmental agencies. These statutes and reg-
ulatory provisions either require or strongly encourage corporations to disclose privileged
information.
63
56. See ACP & WPD, supra note 41, at 60; see also Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the
Litigator, 84 MicH. L. REv. 1605 (1986) (providing a thorough discussion of what constitutes waiver of attorney-
client privilege).
57. The offensive use doctrine holds that when a party affirmatively and voluntarily introduces an issue
related to advice she received from her attorney into a proceeding, that party impliedly waives the confidentiality
of her communications with her lawyer. See Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1992).
The offensive use doctrine is not discussed in this article as it does not arise as a result of a multinational entity
using in-house counsel in Europe, but as a result of a party to a proceeding injecting an issue related to counsel's
advice. For a discussion of the offensive use doctrine, see James L. Cornell, Piercing the Iron Curtain of Silence:
The Doctrine of Offensive Use Waiver, 60 TEx. B. J. 304 (1997).
58. Whether inadvertent disclosure constitutes waiver is a controversial issue. Courts generally apply one
of three tests to determine if inadvertent disclosure waives attorney-client privilege. The strict responsibility
test holds that any voluntary disclosure, even inadvertent, is an automatic waiver and loss of privilege. See In
re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that "bureaucratic error" resulting in disclosure of
privileged documents waived the privilege). The second test, the client's subjective intent test, is at the opposite
end of the spectrum and is adopted by very few courts, holding that if disclosure is inadvertent, there was no
intention to waive and thus the privilege remains because waiver requires intent. See Mendenhall v. Barber-
Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. I11. 1982). The third test, adopted by the majority of courts, falls in the
middle of strict responsibility and the subjective intent test, balancing the reasonableness of the precautions
taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure, the time taken to rectify the error, the scope of the discovery, the
extent of the disclosure, and the overarching consideration of fairness. See Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988
F.2d 1425, 1433 (5th Cir. 1993). It should be noted that generally inadvertent waiver does not waive all attorney-
client privilege, but only the privilege for the documents inadvertently disclosed. See In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cit. 1984). A minority of courts do, however, hold that inadvertent disclo-
sure constitutes waiver of "attorney-client privilege as to all communications on the subject covered by these
communications." United States v. W. Elec. Co., 132 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1990).
59. "Patently, a voluntary disclosure of information which is inconsistent with the confidential nature of the
attorney-client relationship waives the privilege." Alldread, 988 F.2d at 1434.
60. ACP & WPD, supra note 41, at 60.
61. An example of a required reporting statute is 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1)(B)(ii), which gives the Office of
Thrift Supervision the authority to examine "all relevant books, records and documents of any type" of savings
organizations which it is investigating. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(1)(B)(ii) (1999) (emphasis added).
62. The SEC has implemented a Voluntary Disclosure Program to assist it in its effort to regulate securities.
Under the Voluntary Disclosure Program, the SEC contacts a corporation and asks that it conduct an internal
investigation and report the findings of that investigation to the SEC. The incentive offered to a corporation
to do this is more lenient treatment by the SEC should a violation of securities law be found. See 69A Am.juR.
2D Securities Regulation-Federal § 1637 (1999); see also infra notes 68-85 and accompanying text.
63. The Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines provide that if a corporation is convicted in a criminal
prosecution (many agency regulations provide criminal sanctions for corporate violators), the size of the fine
assessed, or the sentences imposed on individuals within the corporation will be increased if the corporation has
impeded the investigation, and will be reduced if the corporation has cooperated. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
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Obviously, the goal of these statutes and voluntary disclosure provisions is to promote
corporate compliance. 64 The statutes and disclosure programs typically provide for confi-
dentiality of the information disclosed. 6 5 The paradox created, however, is that the majority
of courts disregard the confidentiality provisions that accompany these disclosures and only
consider the fact that the corporation voluntarily disclosed privileged communications to a
potentially adverse third-party.66 And, as a voluntary disclosure, the majority of courts hold
that this action waives the attorney-client privilege.
The minority opinion is illustrated in Diversified Ind. v. Meredith.6 7 In Diversified, the
Eighth Circuit held that voluntary disclosure pursuant to an agency subpoena constitutes
only "limited waiver. " 6 1 Thus, the communication disclosed to the agency remains privi-
leged against all other parties. 69 The majority of courts, however, reject the concept of
limited waiver. Four years after the Eighth Circuit decided Diversified, the D.C. Circuit
addressed the issue in Permian Corp. v. United States.70 In Permian, the plaintiff had sub-
mitted documents to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to a confiden-
tiality agreement in an attempt to expedite a proposed exchange offer.' When the plaintiff
subsequently claimed attorney-client privilege over the submitted documents, the court
held that a party cannot assert privilege against one opponent and not another, and thus
that the plaintiff had waived the confidentiality of the documents as to all third-parties."
Ten years after Permian, the Third Circuit similarly held that disclosure to a government
agency constitutes waiver of privilege as to all other parties.73 In Westinghouse v. Republic of
the Philippines, the court greatly expanded what constitutes voluntary disclosure and under
what circumstances third-party disclosure waives privilege.7 4 In response to an SEC inves-
tigation, Westinghouse hired outside counsel to investigate potential violations of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).75 On concluding the investigation, counsel reported
Manual 8C. See Arthur F. Mathews, Defending SECand DOI FCPA Investigations and ConductingRelated Corporate
Internal Investigations: The Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC Consent Decree Settlements, 18 Nw. J. IN-r'L L. & Bus. 303
(1998) (providing an excellent and thorough discussion of the Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
effects on the practice of a multinational entity). In a memorandum on principles of federal prosecution ofbusiness
organizations, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson instructs that a corporation's willingness to waive
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine is a factor to consider in assessing the degree of a cor-
poration's cooperation with an investigation and therefore in determining whether to prosecute thatcorporation.
See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department ofJustice, to Heads
of Department Components and United States Attomeys (Jan. 20, 2003) (on file with author).
64. See Edward S. Rapier, Jr., Corporations: The Federal Sentencing Guidelinesfor Organizations: How TheyAffect
a Civil Practice, 46 LA. B. J. 20 (1998) ("Many commentators have suggested that the main justification for
holding corporations criminally liable is the deterrence of future criminal conduct and the encouragement of
diligent supervision by company managers.").
65. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 383.
66. The disclosure has been found to be voluntary whether required by statute, subpoena, or undertaken
pursuant to a disclosure program.
67. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cit. 1977).
68. Diversified had disclosed the information at issue in a nonpublic SEC investigation. Id. at 611.
69. See id.
70. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cit. 1981).
71. Id. at 1216.
72. See id. at 1221.
73. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991).
74. See id.
75. See id. at 1418; 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1999). The FCPA prohibits corruptly giving anything of value to a
foreign government official or international organization to obtain or retain business.
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their findings in two letters.76 One of the letters was shown to the SEC, with reference to
SEC confidentiality provisions."
During the same period, the Department of Justice (DOJ) had initiated a parallel inves-
tigation of Westinghouse."8 The DOJ subpoenaed the two letters prepared by counsel, as
well as all other documents counsel had obtained in the investigation.9 Westinghouse
moved to quash the subpoena, but subsequently disclosed the documents to the grand jury
after entering into a confidentiality agreement with the DOJ.8° The confidentiality agree-
ment was then memorialized in a stipulated court order.,
Considering a matter emanating from the FCPA investigation, the Third Circuit re-
viewed Westinghouse's claim that documents previously shared with the SEC and the DOJ
were exempt from disclosure to the government of the Republic of the Philippines. 2 The
court eventually rejected Westinghouse's argument that the documents were privileged
pursuant to SEC confidentiality regulations and the court order memorializing the agree-
ment with the DOJ.83 In its reasoning, the court found that Westinghouse waived the
attorney-client privilege by making disclosures to third-parties that were not necessary to
advance the privilege's goal of encouraging clients to seek informed legal advice.8 4 Further,
the court held that Westinghouse had waived the work product doctrine by disclosing the
documents to an adversary.8 " Reasoning that the purpose of the work product doctrine is
to promote the adversarial system, the court determined that disclosure to any adversary is
contrary to the work product doctrine, and thus constitutes waiver as to all third-parties. 6
Most courts agree with the underlying premise in Westinghouse, that a voluntary disclosure
to a third-party that is not necessary to encourage clients to seek informed legal advice
constitutes waiver of attorney-client privilege even when the party receiving the otherwise
privileged information agrees not to disclose the communications.8" With this broad defi-
nition of what constitutes voluntary disclosure and waiver, disclosure of privileged docu-
ments to any third-party, pursuant to grand jury subpoena, confidentiality agreement, or
otherwise, can defeat the privilege.
The majority opinion generally finds that disclosure to any non-privileged party consti-
tutes waiver. Because in-house counsel is a non-privileged party in Europe, it is arguable
that a multinational entity using in-house counsel in the European Union effectively waives
its attorney-client privilege for that attorney's communications taking place in, or relating
76. Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1418.
77. See id.




82. See id. at 1417.
83. Seeid. at 1426-27, 1430-31.
84. See id. at 1426.
85. See id. at 1417.
86. See id. at 1428.
87. See, e.g., Hawkinsv. Stables, 148 F.3d 379(4th Cir. 1998) (holding that disclosure of confidentialmaterial
to a party not "embraced by the privilege" constitutes waiver); United States v. Workman, 138 F.3d 1261 (8th
Cir. 1998) (holding that voluntary disclosure expressly waives attorney-client privilege); Genentech, Inc. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cit. 1997) (holding that inadvertent disclosure during
patent infringement litigation constituted general waiver); United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681
(1st Cir. 1997) (disclosure to Defense Contract Audit Agency constituted waiver of attorney-client privilege).
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to, the European operations. This would result in communications that would be privileged
in the United States being available as evidence in an American proceeding because of the
disparity of treatment of in-house counsel in the European Union.
B. CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Confidentiality in Europe is less encompassing than confidentiality in the United States.
Under E.U. Community law, attorney-client privilege is not specifically granted. The Eu-
ropean Court of Justice in AM & S v. Comm'n held, however, that attorney-client privilege
exists when two criteria are satisfied: (1) the communication is made for the purpose and
in the interest of the client's defense; and (2) the lawyer is independent." An independent
lawyer is one who is not employed by his or her client.89 The AM & S decision further held
that the privilege only extends to attorneys entitled to practice in a Member State2°
Finding that attorney-client privilege existed in some form in each of the E.U. Member
States, the court adopted criteria representing the common elements required in each
state. 9' In-house counsel do not enjoy attorney-client privilege because four Member States
do not permit in-house counsel to be members of the bar, and thus do not recognize any
privilege for communications between attorneys and their employer-clients?2 Thus, outside
lawyers in Europe enjoy a protection of confidentiality in communicating with their clients.
This protection does not extend to in-house counsel, which presents the problem for multi-
national entities using in-house counsel to coordinate their legal affairs in a global market
place that includes the European Union.
C. MODEL RULES COMPARED
In both the United States and the European Union, model rules of professional conduct
set standards for the professional conduct of attorneys. In the United States, the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) were promulgated by the American Bar As-
sociation in 1983.91 The Model Rules do not, in themselves, have the binding effect of law.
94
88. See AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 1982 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 5047 (1979).
89. See id.
90. In Hilti, the ECJ extended the privilege adopted in AM & S to include notes or memorandum written
by the client after consultation with the attorney. Hilti AG v. Comm'n, Case T-30/89A, 1990 E.C.R. 11-163,
11-170. The decision in Hilti "suggests that advice may be widely disseminated in the undertaking to ensure
compliance, and still remain privileged." Maurits Dolmans, Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House Counsel: A
European Proposal, 4 COLUM. J. EUa. L. 125, 129 (1998).
91. Finland, however, does not recognize privilege for outside lawyers or in-house counsel. See id. at 128.
For a country-by-country overview of the law at the time AM & S was decided, see Opinion of Advocate
General Warner, AM & S, 1982 E.C.R. at 1632-37; Opinion ofAdvocate General Slynn, AM &S , 1982 E.C.R.
at 1651-53, 1656-58.
92. Countries that do grant counsel status to in-house lawyers, and thus do not recognize privileged com-
munications by in-house counsel include Belgium, Italy, France, and Luxembourg. E.U. countries recognizing
in-house counsel as members of the bar include Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See Allison M. Hill, A Problem of Privilege: In-House Counsel and the
Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States and the European Community, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INr'L L. 145, 157
(1995).
93. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983); CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1983).
94. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY 12 (6th ed. 1995).
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The Model Rules become legally binding only upon adoption by individual state supreme
courts. 9 Currently, approximately thirty-five states have adopted the Model Rules with
minor alterations. 96 In Europe, the CCBE Code of Conducff (CCBE Code) was established
to provide a legal ethics code to be followed by lawyers within the European Union. Similar
to the Model Rules, the CCBE Code requires E.U. Member States to adopt the Code for
it to have binding legal effect.98 The CCBE Code has been more successful than its Amer-
ican counterpart, gaining universal acceptance in Europe.9 9 Consequently, "as a practical
matter ... the CCBE Code is now binding." °° This section provides a discussion of the
Model Rules and CCBE Code regarding confidentiality in the United States and the Eu-
ropean Union.'50 In this discussion, it is assumed that a lawyer is bound by the Model Rule
or CCBE Code provision discussed.
1. United States: Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Model Rule 1.6 provides for confidentiality of information.I °2 The rule states that "a
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client
consents after consultation."'' 03 Rule 1.13 provides "a lawyer employed or retained by an
organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents."0"4
Thus, Rule 1.13 provides that communications between in-house counsel and corporate
95. See id.
96. See id. This is not to say the other states do not have a code of professional responsibility. These states
generally adopted the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility with various alterations and amend-
ments. See id.
97. Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN
THE EUROPEAN CoMMtmiT § 2.3.1 (1988). SeeJohn Toulmin, A Worldwide Common Code of Professional Ethics?
15 FoRDHAM INr'L L.J. 673 (1992) (providing a background discussion on the rules of professional ethics in
the EU).
98. See Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the European Community's Legal Ethics Code Part I: an Analysis of
the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 12 (1993).
99. See id. Whether all Member States have adopted the Code is an issue about which there is some
controversy. Professor Terry identifies a number of sources confirming that all Member States have adopted
the Code, as well as a number of sources indicating that some Member States have not accepted the Code.
The director of the CCBE has indicated that the CCBE Code has been adopted by all Member States. See id.
at n.40.
100. Id. at 12.
101. This article examines how the Model Rules and CCBE Code regulate professional conduct in general,
and does not analyze how any particular American State or European member state has altered, interpreted,
or amended either the Rules or the Code.
102. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983).
103. Id. The full text of Rule 1.6 reads:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents
after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (I)
to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or (2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the
lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or
to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
Id.
104. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.I.13 (1983).
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constituents are protected within the confidentiality provision of Rule 1.6. Consequently,
American attorneys working as in-house counsel are under an ethical obligation to maintain
the confidentiality of their communications with their employer-client pursuant to the pro-
fessional code.
2. European Community: CCBE Code and the Lawyer Services Directive
In 1988, the European Community adopted the CCBE Code as a framework of profes-
sional conduct principles applicable in all cross-border activities between lawyers in the
EEC.' 05 The CCBE Code article 2.3 provides for confidentiality. Article 2.3.1 provides:
It is of the essence of a lawyer's function that he should be told by his client things which the
client would not tell to others, and that he should be the recipient of other information on a
basis of confidence. Without the certainty of confidentiality there cannot be trust. Confiden-
tiality is therefore a primary right and duty of the lawyer.
106
This article creates an "absolute rule of confidentiality without any exceptions."'0 7 Article
2.3.2 defines the information protected as all information "given [a lawyer] by his client,
or received by him about his client or others in the course of rendering services to his
client."' 08 The CCBE Code does not address the issue of employer-clients. The failure to
mention the employer-clients may indicate the "disagreement lurking behind this rule." °9
The significant differences in treatment by the Member States of the status of in-house
counsel has resulted in "an underground debate" regarding the applicability of this provi-
sion of the CCBE Code to in-house counsel, and corporate-client communications.' 0The
result of this debate, as evidenced in the AM & S decision, has been a refusal to extend
confidentiality to communications between counsel and their employer-clients."'
The Lawyers Services Directive,' adopted by the European Council, furthers that re-
fusal, providing that a lawyer "shall observe the rules of professional conduct of the host
Member State, without prejudice to his obligations of the Member State from which he
comes.""
' 3 This Directive effectively defeats attorney-client privilege for a lawyer who
comes from a country that recognizes in-house attorney-client privilege, but is representing
the client in a country that does not, thus making it difficult for in-house counsel to effec-
tively represent a multinational entity."4 These codified rules of professional ethics gov-
erning the behavior of lawyers in the European Union are indicative of the resistance the
European Union has to extending confidentiality privileges to in-house counsel commu-
nications with their employer-client. This resistance not only makes it difficult for European
attorneys to work as in-house legal advisers, it also has opened the door for multinational
105. See Toulmin, supra note 97.
106. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY art. 2.3.1 (1988).
107. Terry, supra note 7, at 27.
108. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 106, § 2.3.2.
109. Terry, supra note 7, at 27.
110. Id. at 29.
111. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
112. Council Directive 77/249, art. 57-66, 1977 OJ. (L 78) 17. The Lawyers Services Directive is similar
to the Canons of the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, because it provides aspirational rather
than regulatory guidance for attorneys.
113. Council Directive 77/249, art. 57-66, 1977 OJ. (L 78) 17.
114. See Allison Hill, A Problem of Privilege: In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client Privilege in the United
States and the European Community, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 145, 164 (1995).
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entities who use in-house counsel in Europe to be exposed to significant risk of disclosure
of otherwise privileged communications.
III. European Counission Decisions Based on In-House
Counsel Communications
Two decisions by the European Commission illustrate the European Union's "deep
seated suspicion of the independence of in-house counsel,"" and the risk presented by the
lack of privilege for in-house counsel communications. Both cases occurred in the 1980s
and both involved violations of E.U. competition law.
To illustrate the significance of these cases, it is useful first to examine how E.U. com-
petition laws are enforced. In the European Union, the executive body is the European
Commission, which has jurisdiction over enforcement of E.U. competition laws pursuant
to articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome., 6 Articles 85 and 86 of the European Economic
Community regulate competition law in the E.U. Articles 11 and 14 of Regulation 17/62
provide the Commission with authority to gather all necessary information to determine
whether a violation of E.U. competition rules has occurred."' Once an investigation is
complete, the Commission files a complaint, or a 'Statement of Objections.'"" The accused
is then invited to a brief hearing before the Commission." 9 The Commission then may
render its decision, with the authority to impose severe fines, cease and desist orders, and/
or injunctions.'2 0 With this broad enforcement authority, the Commission is described as
"investigator, prosecutor, judge and jury, all in one."''
Under Regulation 17/62, the rights of the defense must be respected, including attorney-
client privilege. However, as seen in John Deere and Sabena, both cases where investigation
and discovery took place pursuant to Regulation 17/62, in-house counsel communications
are not protected as a right of the defense. On the contrary, the lack of privilege afforded
in-house counsel communications provides an opportunity for the Commission to obtain
discovery of work done by attorneys in the effort to effectuate company compliance with
relative laws.' 2 This is precisely the problem illustrated in the introduction to this article.
A. JOHN DEERE
In 1982, the National Farmers Union of the United Kingdom filed a complaint with the
European Commission that an independent John Deere distributor in Belgium refused to
115. Mary C. Daly, The Ethical Implications of the Globalization of the Legal Profession: A Challenge to the Teaching
of Professional Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 21 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1239, 1279.
116. See Burkard, supra note 17, at 678-79.





122. A number of commentators have argued that in-house counselors are in a better position to advise their
clients on how to comply with regulatory and national laws of the European Union, which they assert is almost
necessary in light of the E.U.'s complex legal and regulatory framework. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 114, at 185-
89; Dolmans, supra note 90; Daiske Yoshida, The Applicability Of The Attorney-Client Privilege To Communications
With Foreign Legal Professionals, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 209.
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supply a tractor to one of the Union's members.'23 The Commission conducted an inves-
tigation, during which it took copies of nearly 150 documents relating to John Deere's
trans-border sales.11 4 After examining these documents, the Commission filed a Statement
of Objections.25 John Deere and the independent dealers submitted written responses,
neither asking for a hearing.26 Nearly five months later, the Commission published quo-
tations from the documents that were the foundation of its forthcoming decision.27 Deere
commented on the quotations and, nearly two years after the Union complained, the Com-
mission rendered its decision finding that John Deere violated article 85(1) of the Treaty
of Rome, and fined Deere 2,000,000 European Currency Unit (ECU)128
Within the information discovered in the 150 documents were two written opinions
drafted by in-house counsel for Deere. First, in-house counsel wrote opinions to both
American and European managers that the company was effectively constraining parallel
exports' 129 and that contractual export bans violated E.U. competition law. 30 Second, in-
house counsel, apparently in an attempt to protect the company from liability, attached a
"qualifying clause" to its sales contracts, which read that "[t]he purchaser undertakes, as far
as no contrary regulation prevents, not to resell articles.., abroad with or without modi-
fication either directly or indirectly."'' The Commission determined that this qualifying
clause indicated that the company knew it was in violation of the E.U. competition laws,
and that it had intentionally disregarded those laws."'
B. SABENA
In Sabena, another action involving a violation of E.U. competition law, the European
Commission used in-house counsel communications against Sabena Airlines, finding that
in-house counsel communications indicated the company knew that its actions violated E.U.
competition law. This finding led to an aggravated damage award of 100,000 ECU rendered
against Sabena."3
IV. United States Cases Seeking Discovery through No-
Privilege Laws
In two cases, Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., S.A. '14 and Honeywell, Inc. v. Minolta
Camera Co., Ltd., U.S. district courts have addressed the question whether information that
would be privileged in the United States, but is not privileged in jurisdictions outside of
the United States, is privileged against discovery requests in proceedings in an American
court. Reaching different conclusions, both courts focused on the person claiming the privi-








131. Burkard, supra note 17, at 681.
132. See id.
133. Commission Decision 88/589, art. 86, 1988 OJ. (L 317) 47.
134. 98 F.R.D. 442 (D. Del. 1982) (involving antitrust).
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lege, one finding that French in-house counsel was the functional equivalent of an American
attorney, and thus was entitled to privileged communications; the other finding that a Jap-
anese patent advisor did not hold the appropriate status to claim privilege for his com-
munications with his corporate employer.
In Renfield, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware found that under the
Hague Evidence Convention"' the defendant corporation, with offices in both the United
States and France, could invoke privileges recognized by either French or American law
against production of documents. 3 6 The court held "whether the individual is competent
to render legal advice and is permitted by [local] law to do so" determinative.3 7 Finding
that French in-house counsel "have legal training and are employed to give legal advice to
corporate officials on matters of legal significance to the corporation" the court held the
communications privileged, even though the communications would not have been privi-
leged in France. "'
Reaching the opposite conclusion, the U.S. District Court for the District of NewJersey
applied the functional equivalence test adopted in Renfield, and held that communications
from a Japanese patent advisor were not privileged.'19 The court determined that privilege
would not extend to the advisor, who was not licensed to practice law in any country, and
had never been registered as a patent agent in the United States or in Japan. 140
V. Application of Legal Principles to the Problem
The problem addressed in this article can be illustrated by two scenarios: parallel pro-
ceedings in the United States and Europe and internal investigations within a corporation.
In either of these situations, material otherwise privileged in the United States, but not
privileged in Europe, may be discoverable in the United States due to the conflicting laws.
A. PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS
In the United States, parallel proceedings are seen in two instances: (1) when more than
one agency has parallel jurisdiction, and (2) when civil and criminal suits are brought as to
the same facts. Absent a showing of substantial prejudice, or special circumstances, parallel
proceedings are allowed.' t'
American courts allow liberal sharing of information between proceedings. In adminis-
trative parallel procedures, Westinghouse and Permian hold that communications disclosed
in one agency proceeding will be available to the other agency regardless of the first agency's
agreement to maintain confidentiality of the information disclosed. 142 In parallel criminal
135. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 2
B.D.I.E.L. 829, art. 21(3).
136. Renfield, 98 F.R.D. at 444.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Honeywell, Inc. v. Minolta Camera Co., Ltd., 1990 VVL 66182 (D.NJ. 1990).
140. Id. at 3. Patent law is an area where trans-border privilege is commonly at issue. See Mendenhall v.
Barber-Green Co., 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. I1. 1982) (protecting communications among U.S., British, and
Canadian patent agent); Mitts & Merrill, Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 112 F.R.D. 349 (N.D. 11. 1986) (protecting
communications with German patent agent). See also Yoshida, supra note 122 (discussing attorney-client privi-
lege in transnational intellectual property issues).
141. Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
142. See supra notes 19-3 5 and accompanying text.
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and civil actions, the courts similarly allow for liberal sharing of discovery.' 4' In United States
v. Kordel, the defendants argued that the use of the civil discovery process in building the
government's criminal case "reflected such unfairness and want for consideration of justice"
as to require reversal of their convictions.'" The Supreme Court disagreed, and noted that
"the government had not brought the civil action solely to obtain evidence for its criminal
prosecution.'
45
1. Affirmative Use of the Privilege Disparity
a. U.S./E.U. Parallel Proceedings Comparable to U.S./U.S. Parallel Proceedings
An attorney in the United States-whether private or governmental-may argue that
any information disclosed in a European proceeding should be available in U.S. proceedings
as it would be available in a comparable parallel proceeding within the United States To
overcome this initial argument requires counsel to show that (1) there would be substantial
prejudice to the company should the information be disclosed, or (2) that the situation
presented by parallel proceedings in two nations presents a special circumstance calling for
protection of privileges recognized in the United States, but not recognized in Europe.
Defense counsel may argue that the European action was filed merely to have access to
evidence otherwise not available in the United States.
b. Waiver
The next argument an attorney making affirmative use of the disparity might make is
that the company has waived its attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel communi-
cations in Europe. First, the company utilized in-house counsel knowing that in-house
counsel does not enjoy attorney-client privilege in Europe. Second, the company disclosed
information to an adversary, the E.U. regulator, destroying any work product privilege or
remaining attorney-client privilege that may have existed. Finally, the company waived its
privilege by allowing an American attorney to represent it in Europe, where any privilege
first depends on membership of the bar of a member state. Under the current state of the
confidentiality laws regarding attorney-client privilege and waiver in the United States, any
of these arguments may succeed. 46
2. Defense Arguments
a. Hague Evidence Convention
47
To overcome these arguments, counsel should begin with The Hague Evidence Con-
vention, as applied in Renfield.' 4s Article 2 1(e) of the Convention provides that: "[A] person
requested to give evidence may invoke the privilege and duties to give the evidence con-
tained in Article 11.' 149 Article 11 provides: "[T]he person concerned may refuse to give
143. See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970); Dresser, 628 F.2d at 1368 (involving a civil investigation
by the SEC and a criminal investigation by the DOJ of FCPA violations by Dresser).
144. Kordel, 397 U.S. at 11.
145. Id.
146. See supra notes 9-35 and accompanying text.
147. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2 B.D.I.E.L. 829,
art. 2 1(e).
148. Renfield, 98 F.R.D. at 443.
149. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2 B.D.I.E.L. 829,
art. 2 1(e).
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evidence insofar as he has a privilege or duty to refuse to give the evidence-(a) under the
law of the State of execution; or (b) under the law of the State of origin." 50 Counsel must
thus establish that privilege exists in the United States in order to invoke the confidentiality
provision of the Convention.
b. Privilege Exists in United States and No Waiver
To establish that privilege exists in the United States, the communication must first satisfy
the Upjohn criteria. Then, counsel must establish that the existent privilege was not waived.
Diversified may provide a basis for counsel's argument that disclosure in the European suit
does not constitute waiver. Under the Diversified reasoning, counsel may argue that disclo-
sure in the European action constituted only limited waiver. The difficulty in this argument
is that the plaintiffs in the European and the American actions are the same parties. Con-
sequently, a court may reject the argument of limited waiver as disclosure would be to the
same party in both actions. Alternatively, a court may accept the argument and maintain
the privilege for the communications. In that situation, the plaintiffs may have the oppor-
tunity to gain invaluable information in the European proceeding regarding the defense
strategy, placing the plaintiffs in an advantageous situation in the U.S. action.
c. Adversarial System
Should the court reject the limited waiver argument, counsel may assert that by disclosing
the information, there would be substantial interference with the adversarial system. As this
was the crux of the court's reasoning in Westinghouse, this argument may protect some of
the communications and the work product of the attorney. Because of the uncertainty in
any of these arguments, counsel is wise to take preventative measures when conducting an
investigation in preparation of a defense.
B. INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
An internal investigation may take place upon suit(s) being filed or in preventative mea-
sures to ensure compliance with applicable laws. When a suit is filed and the company's
operation in Europe is implicated, the most prudent course of action is to hire outside local
European counsel to conduct the investigation in preparation of a defense. This may be a
more costly and time intensive method, but it will protect communications and work prod-
uct accumulated and reported in the process of the investigation. Should American in-house
counsel be used, the company should be prepared to disclose any information counsel
obtains in Europe, and thus possibly in the United States.
To limit the impact of disclosure in the United States, counsel should be careful to keep
to a minimum written communications, notes, and memoranda dealing with the investi-
gation. Any written reports should be clearly marked as "Privileged Attorney-Client Com-
munication" or "Privileged Work Product of Attorney." While these measures may not
fully protect the privilege, several decisions have indicated that lack of aggressive protection
of privilege is a factor in determining whether the communication or work product will be
found to be privileged. Finally, should the communication or work-product be subpoenaed,
counsel should argue aggressively against disclosure. Should a confidentiality agreement be
offered, counsel should be prepared for a court to find the agreement meaningless. And
150. Id. art. 11.
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last, counsel should not rely on regulatory confidentiality provisions, such as the SEC pro-
visions relied on in Westinghouse, as those provisions may be deemed irrelevant in light of
counsel's willingness to disclose confidential information to an adversary.
VI. Conclusion
This article began with the question of what, exactly, is the risk a multinational entity
undertakes by using in-house counsel in Europe. The answer is that it is difficult to say.
American courts have not fully addressed the question, but it is almost certain that litigants
will try to take advantage of the disparate treatment of privilege on either side of the
Northern Atlantic. The question itself should create concern for multinational entities that
use in-house counsel in Europe. Such a company may want to cease using in-house counsel
in Europe or take other precautionary measures to protect itself against an unintended
waiver of attorney-client privilege. While the no-privilege rule has only been used to obtain
evidence against a company in antitrust cases thus far, it is easy to see how the rule might
be expanded to allow access to valuable information that would otherwise be privileged as
attorney-client communications. The question is left for the in-house practitioner and the
global enterprise to determine their risk tolerance.
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